Research on control takeover techniques for counter-UAV (Unmanned Aircraft Vehicle)

Abstract

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have become increasingly integral in both civilian and military domains due to their flexibility, cost-effectiveness, and mission endurance. However, this widespread adoption introduces complex security challenges, especially in terms of managing and preventing unauthorized UAV activities. Among the emerging counter-UAV techniques, hijacking UAVs by exploiting control protocol vulnerabilities is considered a promising and cost-efficient approach, particularly for research and defense applications. This paper presents technical findings related to hijacking-based countermeasures against UAVs by targeting the MAVLink protocol - a widely adopted lightweight communication protocol for UAV command and telemetry. The research outlines the architecture of UAV control systems, identifies protocol vulnerabilities and demonstrates how spoofed control packets can lead to full UAV takeover. The results show that, due to the lack of encryption and authentication in MAVLink 1.0, an attacker can successfully disrupt and override mission commands, effectively hijacking UAVs. This virtual simulation provides a valuable resource for education, training, and further research on UAV cybersecurity, particularly in environments where access to real UAV systems and field conditions is limited. The study emphasizes the importance of protocol security in UAV systems and opens new directions for proactive defense strategies.